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1 Introduction
Proposals for verifiable electronic voting that provide
assurances for secrecy of the ballot and integrity of
the election have been in the academic literature since
the early 1980s with real world systems proposed in
the 2000’s — but the challenge of making verifiable
voting usable and practical for ordinary voters and in-
tegration into existing paper based election processes
has meant that practical deployment has been slow
in coming.
This paper reports on the experience of deploy-
ing the vVote verifiable voting system in the Novem-
ber 2014 State election in Victoria, Australia. It de-
scribes the system that was deployed, discusses its
end-to-end verifiability, and reports on the voters and
poll workers experience with the system.
The State of Victoria has a proud history of inno-
vation in voting systems, having introduced the first
strict supervisory controls at polling places in 1856 [1]
with government printed ballots, logistic checks and
balances and the private booth. More recently, the
Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) was an early
adopter of electronic voting, and fielded systems in
2006 and 2010. The Electoral Act changes for elec-
tronic voting in Victoria intended better accessibility
for blind, partially sighted, and motor impaired vot-
ers through customised computer voting interfaces.
The Act was amended in 2010 to extend access to
voters speaking languages other than English and any
voters out of state and overseas, enabling more rapid
return of the votes into the tallying process.
Australia has no e-voting standards or guidelines
(except the voluntary Telephone Voting Standards
TVS2.0) so the Victorian Electoral Commission was
guided by the US Voluntary Voting System Guide-
lines [2] as these were seen to be the most recent,
progressive, and considered networked IT security
threats. In addition software independence [3] is a
critical basis for trustworthy voting systems: that
“an undetected change or error in the software can-
not cause an undetectable change or error in the elec-
tion outcome”. In place of systems certification, an
e-voting specialist agency Demtech, was selected to
review compliance with the published protocols and
fitness to deploy [4].
The election system in Victoria poses particular
challenges for any verifiable solution, because of the
complexity of the ballots. Voters vote in two races in
State Elections: for the Legislative Assembly, voters
rank all of the candidates in preferential order, usu-
ally up to ten candidates. For the Legislative Council
voters either select one party or group (Above Line),
or they rank the individual candidates (typically up
to 40) in their preferred order (Below Line).
There are 8 regions comprising 88 districts, so there
are 96 races in total. Nominations for candidates
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were open until Noon on Friday 14th November 2014,
and the electronic system needed to be ready to take
votes from Monday 17th November. There is a period
of two weeks of “early voting” for which the electronic
system is deployed, up to the official election day on
Saturday 29th November. Electronic voting is only
available during early voting and voters are allowed
to use any polling station to cast a ballot in their
home races. Thus all polling stations must offer ballot
forms for all the races across the State.
The total number of registered voters for the 2014
election was 3.8 million, of whom the Australian Bu-
reau of Statistics1 indicate as many as 186,000 Vic-
torian travellers, 100,000 adults not proficient in En-
glish and 118,000 adults with low vision or blindness2
were eligible to vote using the electronic system.
A total of 1121 votes were collected. This was more
votes than were collected by the 2010 electronic sys-
tem, and the system was deployed at fewer locations
(25 instead of 101).
2 Related work
The only statutory end-to-end verifiable elections to
date have taken place in Takoma Park, Maryland,
US, where the Scantegrity system was successfully
used in 2009 and 2011 in the municipal election for
mayor and city council members [5]. Scantegrity has
been adapted and trialled for remote voting (“Re-
motegrity”) [6] as well as voting for blind voters (“Au-
diotegrity”) [7]. This groundbreaking work demon-
strated the feasibility of running an election in a ver-
ifiable way, including with people who have barriers
to voting. However, the Scantegrity system becomes
impractical with a preferential ballot of up to 40 can-
didates and may require up to 200 mark-sense ovals
to allow ordering of at least 5 candidates in this case
and many more to allow numbering all 40 candidates
in order of preference.
There is a rich body of work covering remote vot-
ing, DRE machines and many others which we cannot
1http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats
2Blind Citizens Australia, Australian Blind and Vision Im-
paired Statistics
summarise here. We were specifically pursuing end-
to-end verifiability (E2EV) at scale and as such this is
the first work of its kind. We direct the reader to [8]
for an introduction to verifiability in electronic voting
systems, and to [9] for coverage of related systems.
E2EV is an approach to computer security de-
signed specifically for elections, which provides highly
reliable detection of loss, damage or fraud affecting
votes. It is not a method of defence but it does
provide an important new deterrent because any at-
tacker has to consider the likelihood of detection. It
is the case many current security systems can only
report the attacks they have detected. E2EV de-
tects, with high probability, attempts to change the
election outcome, whether the voting system software
performs as expected or not — this is software inde-
pendence. vVote was created to safely collect votes in
a verifiable manner and it replaced a previous third
party system that was not end-to-end verifiable.
3 System Description
The starting point for the design of vVote was the
Preˆt a` Voter split ballot [10] in Figure 1. Since paper-
based Preˆt a` Voter has had differing usability assess-
ment results in its paper form [11, 12], considerable
work went in to its electronic form. It was mandated
that accessibility must extend to polling place veri-
fication. The completed technical design of the sys-
tem as deployed is described in [13], where compar-
isons with other electronic voting schemes are also
discussed.
To facilitate electronic capture, an Electronic Bal-
lot Marker (EBM) was introduced: a common tablet
computer (Google Nexus 10) that provided a voter
interface for capturing the vote. The ballot forms
needed to be printed on demand on a separate tablet
of the same make called the vVote Printing Server
(VPS) for use in each polling place. The design also
introduced a distributed Web Bulletin Board (WBB)
for accepting the votes and making information pub-
lic and immutable.
Once a voter is marked off the electoral roll, they
are printed a candidate list (CL) with the names in
a random order. Voters can demand that their CL is
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Figure 1: Preˆt a` Voter with an EBM: The legal ballot order (at left) is shuﬄed to create candidate lists (CL).
The presentation order in paper Preˆt a` Voter is shuﬄed (top ballots). The vVote ballot (shown on an EBM)
is the legal order. The tablet reads the CL and on receiving the vote it produces the preferences receipt
(PR) in the shuﬄed order. The CL is destroyed after matching against the PR. The PR is retained by the
voter. The information from the PR is later passed through an anonymising mixnet and then decrypted to
reveal the legal order needed for counting.
‘audited’ to check that the printed order matches the
encrypted order that the system has already commit-
ted to. An audited CL cannot then be used to vote
and all such audit results are made public automati-
cally. Following audit the voter is issued with a new
CL. In the 2014 deployment voters were not alerted
to this possibility since there was a concern that the
subtlety of what it was achieving (essentially random
sampling of correct construction of the ballot forms)
was too complex for voters to absorb on the spot or
may cause delays and queueing. For future deploy-
ments some advance education would raise awareness
of this step. The effects of this on verifiability are dis-
cussed below.
When the voter uses a CL to vote, it is read by an
external camera attached to the tablet. The booth
setup for blind voters is illustrated in Figure 2(1)
which shows a tablet computer with a latex screen
overlay that functions like a phone keypad. An-
other interface also for blind voters provided the unlit
screen as a swiping surface. Scanning of the candi-
date list QR code launches the vote capture appli-
cation, which allows the voter to enter their vote.
The EBM interface for sighted voters is illustrated in
Figure 2(2–5). Having voted, a preferences receipt
(PR) is printed separately. The voter verifies that
the preferences match the correct candidate names,
by comparing the lists side by side, as in Figure 2(6)
(or via audio means as below). This check ensures
that the receipt captures the vote as cast. Once this
is done the CL must be destroyed in order to keep
the vote secret. The PR is retained by the voter.
The fact that the candidate names were in a shuﬄed
order ensures that the PR does not expose who the
preferences were for and thus provides ballot secrecy.
The system allows staff to ‘quarantine’ or cancel a
vote if the PR is not provided for any reason, or if the
voter considers it to be incorrect, and in such cases
where the voter reports serious usability issues. The
voter must furnish their CL to request this. Look-
ing up a serial number for a quarantined vote results
in the WBB reporting a signed transaction so this
cannot occur silently. Another kind of quarantine is
called Bulk Quarantine and is a mechanism where by
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the electoral commission can exclude all votes from
one device from being decrypted. Bulk quarantine
occurs outside the protocol and is considered a manual
intervention. In the deployment there were 6 individ-
ual quarantines (due to a receipt printing problem)
and one bulk quarantine (of a single vote, due to a
usability problem and a lost CL).
The voter later looks up their PR on the WBB,
and verifies that it has been included properly, or can
raise a challenge if not. At any time the voter (or any-
one) can also examine the QR code on the PR to see
or hear the shuﬄed order of their preferences, which
should match the visual display. An Android phone
app was also developed that checks the PR signature
against the public key for the election to confirm the
central recording system signed the return. This was
available but not promoted.
It is important to add that all aspects of the vot-
ing ceremony as well as the verification measures in-
tended for voters were also made accessible. A bal-
lot audit could be taken to an EBM and the device
would read the contents out. Both the CL and PR
could be read out separately on any EBM or if pro-
vided together (to give the shuﬄed order of candidate
names if required), the assembled preference-order
vote could be read back to the voter.
Voters can check that their vote is cast as intended
via the CL-PR check. They confirm their vote is
recorded as cast by checking that their preferences on
the receipt correspond to the information recorded
on the WBB. Finally, it is publicly verifiable that
the correct tally is returned, counted as recorded, be-
cause the mixing and decrypting of the encrypted
votes generates cryptographic proofs that can be in-
dependently checked. This provides a chain of links
all the way from the initial creation of blank ballots
to casting of the vote right through to the tallying.
In this election the electronic votes needed to be
combined with paper votes, and so the electronic
votes were printed off to be included within the paper
count. Each printed vote paper included as a footer
the line number for that preference data in the de-
crypted, emitted CSV files of raw votes for staff spot-
audits. In this case we have verifiability through to
the decrypted votes: that any cast vote made it into
the paper count, which was then done in the usual
way.
4 Staff training and voter sup-
port
Concepts in E2EV are very new and some are incon-
sistent with paper election procedures. For example,
the presence of E2EV ballot audits as an option the
voter can pursue is not consistent with conventional
security practices such as seals, which must all be
used, checked, documented and inspected. The nexus
between the simple act of depositing a paper ballot
(irretrievably) from a ballot box and the highly com-
plex nature of transmission and storage of an e-vote
to its repository made ‘quarantine’ a necessary miti-
gation. The paper voting system also has a concept
of quarantine of votes (such as provisional votes for
those voters not found on the electoral register), but
this does not allow removal of a vote from the ballot
box.
vVote follows paper voting logistic processes more
closely than previous e-voting systems used by VEC.
For example, vVote creates fixed numbers of blank
ballots in advance of the election. Previous sys-
tems “created” ballots as they needed them, poten-
tially an uncontrollable quantity. Despite similari-
ties, some new concepts such as the random permu-
tation of candidates also made training more difficult.
Trainees as well as the executive were not certain how
many questions voters would ask and how to answer
them quickly whilst not obscuring transparency as-
pects of the system design. It is likely that longer
term E2EV will settle in the public consciousness
the same way that Single Transferrable Vote (STV)
counting is accepted but not actually fully under-
stood by most Australians. Low STV comprehen-
sion may be lamentable but in fact those who do not
understand it trust that ample others observe and
enforce that STV is performed correctly. We hope
this situation evolves for E2EV.
During development, iterations of the system were
tested under controlled conditions and the same ver-
bal instruction given to cohorts of target users who
were provided to VEC via disability organisations
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1. A voting booth for use by blind voters. A tactile
latex ‘telephone keypad’ overlay sits on the touch-
screen, and headphones provide audio instructions.
2. District ballot visual interface showing preferences
assigned. Voter must number all candidates. Double
arrow scrolls the ballot.
3. Region ballot showing required Above Line prefer-
ence assigned. Voter must choose one party or group.
4. Region ballot showing Below Line preferences as-
signed. Voter must number 5 or more candidates.
5. Summary of preferences for both races in legal
ballot order.
6. Visual matching of the candidate list (CL) and
preference receipt (PR).
Figure 2: Physical and graphic interfaces
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and community groups. In all more than 150 people
were videotaped using the system at least once and
the system was modified to log interface events (this
was removed before the live election). The cohorts
were: functionally blind users (8); users with a range
of low-vision types including retinopathy and tun-
nel vision (10); non-English speaking Arabic (8) and
Mandarin speakers (10); able-bodied English speak-
ers (including VEC sessional and permanent staff of
more than 100); and five subjects who were pro-
foundly disabled with normal cognitive function and
vision.
Much was learned from this process and many
changes to the system were re-tested. Experiences
with right-to-left language di-plurals, drag-and-drop
preference renumbering and a CL that was physically
torn from its PR are some of many trials that led to
the current system. Perhaps the most interesting ob-
servation was that the system was found to be not
usable by some non-English speakers because candi-
date and party names were all voiced and displayed
in English. It has been a common assumption that
even non-English speakers could pattern match pop-
ular party names even if they were not in first lan-
guages or that they could transpose advised voting
preferences from the party literature (called a How
To Vote Card — HTVC) given out on arrival at all
polling places. Under testing for the first time with
non-bilinguals, Arabic speaking subjects could not
for example, find and vote GREENS even with an
Arabic language HTVC. In this case, a change re-
quest was raised and the system was modified so that
touching any (still in English) party name would dis-
play and say that name in the best available transla-
tion for that language.
Close to the final iteration of the testing, the sys-
tem was handed over for third party review to Inclu-
sive UX, a Sydney usability firm who had previously
assessed electronic voting interfaces in Australia. In-
clusive UX did not have a remit to perform their own
testing due to time constraints, but were given a fully
working system and requested to identify risks in the
as-built design. Feedback from this final assessment
resulted in changes to coloration (such as removal of
graded backgrounds) and audio voting changes (such
as fully stating where the audio cursor is on the LC
ballot candidate grid).
5 Deployment
Because this was a completely novel system and to
limit the cohort requiring additional training, VEC
rolled out in a limited deployment in 24 early voting
centres around Victoria including 6 “accessibility su-
per centres”. It was also deployed in the Australia
Centre, London, UK in order to gain experience of
the remote voting solution with voters who had no
barriers to voting. The London centre was run in the
same manner as Victorian centres.
The total number of votes that were received over
the two weeks was 1121, of which 973 were from Lon-
don and the remaining 148 from the 24 centres in the
State of Victoria.
In fact the system was developed for much higher
demands in order to scale up for future elections: it
handled 1 million votes in testing, and under stress
was able to respond to individual voters within 10s,
and to accept 800 votes in a 10s period.
6 Outcomes
A range of instruments were used to obtain feedback
on this project. Participant numbers were small and
so the results are indicative and suggest issues for
deeper investigation. A University of Surrey sur-
vey which intercepted 45 voters leaving the Aus-
tralia Centre in London having cast their votes is
most indicative of the system with the entire voter
cohort. For Victoria, VEC collected 29 responses
to an anonymous opt-in online questionnaire of 54
poll workers which asked questions about equipment
setup and voter support. Both surveys asked about
verifiability, trust and security taken from the survey
instrument of Karayumak et al [14]. VEC also ran a
separate opt-in survey for London voters who volun-
teered their email addresses (60 responses) as well as
for Victorian voters (< 10 responses).
To analyse time-to-vote, server logs were used.
Google Analytics collected information for public-
facing information and lookup services (not the vot-
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ing system). It should also be noted that the voting
protocol does not capture voting interface navigation
actions (as it allows no metadata) and that the EBM
is stateless. These privacy controls prevented live us-
ability data being captured such as the navigation,
changing language or undoing vote choices.
It is likely that two technical problems affected sur-
vey results. There was a missing instruction in the
setup manual for poll workers for when the system
went from a training mode to the live voting mode.
This absence of this setup step caused the receipt
printer not to work until setup was completed prop-
erly. Almost all sites were affected by this but early
intervention by the VEC help desk and four site vis-
its meant very few voters were affected and the prob-
lem was resolved the first day of voting. A second
problem was unrelated to vVote and concerned net-
work problems at VEC. This constrained bandwidth
and caused some remote sites (including London) to
not receive their (29MB) configuration file. Three
sites were not online at start of voting. This problem
was largely resolved by the second day of voting but
London had to revert to paper ballots for two whole
days in total. Setup problems in Victoria may have
impacted the few voters who attended several sites,
causing a disproportionate problem.
Voter surveys
Voters were generally satisfied with the usability of
the system, but there was a wide variation in under-
standing of the security assurances provided. For ex-
ample, some voters answered that the receipt showed
their vote (which it does not, since a receipt should
never link directly to any vote). The results are
shown in Figure 3. Although most voters trusted the
system implicitly they nonetheless took part in the
verifiability steps and many said they would check
receipts at home — there was no resistance to such
new steps reported by Karayumak et al. Data col-
lected in Victoria are for very low numbers of vot-
ers and so we focus on the London results for our
general findings. It is certainly the case that more
work is needed to accurately measure E2EV in the
live polling place for both staff and voters, including
expectations, error coping and comprehension.
Figure 3: Three questionnaire responses from London
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In more detail, the headline results from the voter
surveys were as follows:
1. Respondents found the system easy to use, as
illustrated in Figure 3. 75% or greater respon-
dents stated Agree or Strongly Agree to all pos-
itive aspects of usability. 75% stated they pre-
ferred the system to paper voting. This is also
evident in comments and in the time taken to
vote. 60% of respondents voted in 4 minutes or
under, with 96% in 5-10 minutes or less. This
was the whole time to vote on the system (not
the time to get a PR or wait in queues). None
stated the process took “too long”. 87% stated
Agree or Strongly Agree to the statement “I
would tell other people to use this system.”
2. Respondents trusted the voting system, and this
correlated strongly (Spearman’s correlation co-
efficient r(43) = 0.57; two-tailed p < 0.001) with
the voter agreeing with the system being easy to
use. Just over 60% of respondents had no con-
cerns regarding e-voting security.
3. Respondents found the verification lists easy to
use. About half of the respondents responded
positively to having compared the CL and PR
lists together.
4. About 40% stated they were Very Likely or
Likely to verify their receipt on the VEC website.
In fact there were around 150 receipt lookups,
about 13% of the electronic votes cast.
5. Many respondents did not understand the pur-
pose of the verification measures. This is evident
in low correlation (r(43) = −0.14, p = 0.35) be-
tween “compared CL and PR” with “I under-
stand the printed receipt”. More than half of re-
spondents thought that the voting receipt gave
away the content of their vote, which is not the
case. However, for people “concerned about e-
voting”, comprehension of the receipt was much
better: only a quarter felt the receipt leaked
their vote.
6. An important question from the instrument of
[14] asked if voters still trusted the system given
the survey questions about potential threats.
The voters concerns remained unchanged or even
strengthened (r(43) = 0.80, p < 0.001).
7. One desired outcome of the survey was not ob-
served: that at least some respondents would
use verification measures because they have con-
cerns about e-voting. That is, the survey could
not detect the kind of vigilance that the verifi-
cation relies on via significant negative correla-
tions between “trust” and “use of the verifica-
tion measures” despite strong negative correla-
tion (r(43) = −0.61; p < 0.001) between the e-
voting security question and the question about
trust of the system.
Poll worker surveys
The poll worker surveys were conducted after the
end of the election. There is some over-reporting as
may be expected since the survey responses can in-
clude the same events reported separately. The sum-
mary of findings is:
1. System features for accessibility were well used.
A quarter of respondents set font or contrast for
voters, with forty percent setting audio mode.
Twelve percent of respondents reported setting
a non-English language.
2. The system did not require much intervention
in the voting session, and when this occurred,
the intended support tools were used. In up to
10 cases in Victoria, staff had to complete the
e-vote for voters, and could see the vote being
cast. This is a privacy issue that requires fur-
ther consideration. A quarter of staff respon-
dents reported using the switch to visual support
feature to help an audio voter in-session. No re-
spondents needed to use the switch to English
support feature.
3. The verifiability measures were well used. A
quarter of respondents saw voters perform CL-
PR. Only two respondents handled voters re-
porting the PR did not match their vote.
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4. Staff may have not fully understood verifiabil-
ity. Three quarters of respondents stated they
Strongly Agree or Agree to understanding ver-
ifiability and the printed lists. However, the
same respondents answered differently to ques-
tions asking them about the lookup of receipts
on the web and of CL audit.
5. Although more than half of respondents stated
the system was Too Difficult to Operate or Not
Very Reliable, two thirds stated they would be
happy to support it if more voters came to use
it. One third stated a negative opinion about
e-voting.
6. Staff need more aides to support this system.
Two thirds stated the tablets needed to offer
more help. Half of respondents stated they
needed more training which correlated with a
quarter reporting they got questions they could
not answer, that they would like to know more
and that a quarter did not practice audio voting,
or 20% did not use training mode at all.
Web lookups
The vVote suite of pages on vec.vic.gov.au were all
visited with increasing frequency up to Election Day.
Pages such as the Electronic Voting page were hit
more than 20,000 times, by 18,600 unique viewers.
There were 150 receipt lookups, 139 accesses to the
verification data files, and 55 hits of the source code
repository.
Voters accessed support documents such as loca-
tions of assistive voting centres (950), information
about electronically assisted voting (554), and the
Demtech assessment of vVote (35).
People accessing the vVote suite of pages came
most frequently from LinkedIn (90) and Vision Aus-
tralia (54) and Twitter (24), among others. Google
search outside of VEC was used to access this suite
1071 times with 24 site-internal searches for ‘Elec-
tronic Voting’.
Availability and time to vote
1. The Web Bulletin Board systems were up 100%
with no errors. Average response (reply) time
was 0.3 seconds.
2. A full analysis of the log files showed that no un-
expected exceptions occurred during live voting.
3. London was oﬄine intermittently, totalling
about 14 hours of downtime over the two weeks
due to networking problems. Voters affected by
this voted on paper ballots.
4. London reported queuing and some network
problems and Victoria served voters with a range
of barriers and impairments.
In London the vast majority of voters voted with-
out requesting accessibility or language settings.
They may have made their own settings in this re-
gard once on the EBM. Staff observed only four vot-
ers using a non-visual mode of voting and about the
same number using a non-English language.
5. The average voting session time at the EBM was
172.2 seconds (about 3 minutes), with Above
Line averaging 152.6 seconds, and Below Line
(giving at least 5 preferences) averaging 270 sec-
onds.
In Victoria all eligible voters were either low vision
or totally blind; could not read in English; or, had a
fine motor impairment or illiteracy.
6. The average voting session time was 570.4 sec-
onds (about 9.5 minutes), with Above Line av-
eraging 542.8 seconds and Below Line averaging
658.3 seconds.
The proportion of formal (unspoiled) electronic
votes was 98.13%, with 29 informal votes in Dis-
trict races (2.5%), and 13 informal votes in Region
races (1.15%). Paper election informality in 2014 was
5.22% district, 3.43% region. The voting system pro-
vides warnings for informal or blank votes both with
audio and in-language. It is unlikely voters who cast
informal votes did so unintentionally.
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7 Discussion and Lessons
learned
A number of serious concerns on low rates of E2EV
verification among voters and some previous nega-
tive usability findings for Preˆt a` Voter appear to have
been mitigated in this work and as such E2EV in the
Victorian deployment appears likely to be a repeat-
able and possibly scalable result with some changes
to staff and voter education.
There was an inevitable tension between the de-
sire to allow voters to “vote and go” (i.e. to keep
the voting experience as lightweight as possible, and
reduce queuing) and the need to have security steps
that some of the voters follow, to ensure verifiability.
The voter surveys found that the voters were gen-
erally satisfied with their voting experience, so the
security elements did not obstruct the voting process
for them, and those that wanted to vote and go were
able to do so. Voters did not resist the verifiability
features as was observed (of a different system) in
[14].
However, comprehension was low as was seen in
[14], despite vVote being a live election and not an
experiment, indicating that more work is needed to
find the balance between educating voters before and
during voting, and instructing them to perform veri-
fication measures in session without the risk of con-
siderable delay in the voting ceremony. The lack of
comprehension of the verification measures does not
impact election integrity unless the misunderstand-
ing means that verification audit failures are not de-
tected.
Possibly the most serious problem in this deploy-
ment was the absence of ballot audits. The staff were
trained to perform this and support it but this facility
was not promoted to voters. This is one of the five or
so audits and challenges provided in the data flow of
vVote and ballot audit is very important for catching
influence (and bugs) in the VPS device. Note that
problems with ballot generation on VPS would have
been caught in the self-audit done at ballot genera-
tion time and so it is reasonable to assume ballots
were well formed. It is also the case that a range
of failures and attacks affecting printed CLs would
be picked up by the EBM unless the VPS and EBM
collude. If this occurred votes could be “switched”
so that a vote cast for Alice would become a vote for
Bob. A proportion of voters (and staff or others) per-
forming ballot audits would identify this behaviour,
and so this must be done in ongoing deployments.
More work is needed for future deployments to make
Ballot Audit simple and quick for both staff and vot-
ers so that is it provided in accordance with the sys-
tem protocol. It should be noted that even without
any ballot audits having occurred, the deterrent value
of ballot audits occurring was still present since the
facility to audit was there for any and all who may
have been told to do it. For example, the University
of Melbourne published a plain language voter guide
for vVote explaining all of the audits [15].
Almost half of the staff survey respondents (a quar-
ter of staff) reported the system was difficult to oper-
ate or unreliable. Unfortunately there were technical
problems at the start of election which affected band-
width to VEC and there was a missing instruction in
the setup manual. However, these issues were re-
solved quickly and the rest of the run was largely
problem free. That the London site could collect
more than 900 votes identified that a poll place with
vVote could process good numbers of voters largely
without issue.
It was a tabled risk that the Preˆt a` Voter voting re-
ceipt randomisation of preferences would cause voters
who checked them to think their actual vote had been
changed. For this reason, all surveys included ques-
tions about this. The results show there were some
isolated cases of confusion (six) which were resolved
satisfactorily. It is not the case that voters reported,
or staff observed, voters substantially confused about
the content of verification receipts.
It should not be the case that polling place staff
require a deep technical understanding of vVote (or
cryptography) but it is the case that staff have to an-
swer questions or direct voters to answers about many
aspects of vVote and up to 15% of poll staff reported
one or more instances of questions they could not an-
swer. Staff need to be reassured that they (and the
voters) do not need this expertise in order to take
part in the election. In 2014 many voters thought
the voting receipt was secret. This belief does not
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impose a risk to the voter or their vote but should be
addressed at least so the voter can share the receipt
with others who can also verify it online.
Staff-voter time is very limited and the paper vot-
ing process has enjoyed many years of optimisations
and refinements, so that staff are confident in the pro-
cess, and this must impact positively on voters. In
contrast, if the E2EV scheme is mysterious and staff
are not trained to competence and confidence then
this too will be evident to voters who may refuse
to use the system or refuse to fully exploit it. As
with proportional vote hand counting, which is not
fully understood by most Australians, it remains to
be seen how deeply E2EV concepts are learned by
most or whether most voters trust that others will
understand them. The difference is that E2EV re-
quires a measure of real vigilance from voters who
are relied on to individually test the system for prob-
lems.
Finally, the server system was entirely housed at
VEC. As reported an unrelated technical problem
did indeed impact vVote at the start of the elec-
tion because bandwidth was limited. To mitigate
this, vVote servers should not be housed together,
for both disaster recovery reasons and also for the
Electoral Commission’s plausible deniability in keep-
ing hands off systems that can otherwise collude or
be observed together. That is, there is a privacy risk
when services are homogeneously provided and over-
seen by the same entity: since one entity oversees all
cooperating nodes, it may be possible for them to
align an voter with their vote. A future deployment
should explore how heterogeneous implementations
of the protocol can be served from different machines
at different hosts. The design wholly anticipates this
and it would bring back to e-voting the great value of
mutually distrusting stakeholders having a meaning-
ful oversight of the process: stakeholders can provide
a computing node of their own making and vVote
operates on the quorum of cooperating services.
8 Open Source Project
Although the system was developed for use in the
State of Victoria, much of it can be customised
to elections elsewhere. All the software deployed
in this report, including utilities and Android op-
erating system customisations are GPL3 at bit-
bucket.com/vvote. Documentation, the voter sur-
vey, and other materials from the project are also
included under /doco. The design of vVote is such
that it can be adapted to any kind of ballot style
or process for example single choice, multiple choice,
preference voting, or alternative vote. We hope the
findings of this report and techniques present in the
software sources lead to greater use of this approach
to electronic voting.
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